ANIMAL FARM and 1984: according to EUIPO, titles of literary works are not registrable as trademarks where the public does not perceive them as indicators of commercial origin

By decision of 27 May 2026, issued in joined cases R 1719/2019-G and R 1922/2019-G, the Grand Board of Appeal of EUIPO confirmed the partial refusal of registration of the signs ANIMAL FARM and 1984, corresponding to the titles of George Orwell's famous novels, in respect of a series of goods and services falling, among others, within Classes 9, 16, and 41 (as well as, for the ANIMAL FARM mark alone, Class 28).

On 6 March 2018, the Estate of Sonia Brownell Orwell filed two applications for word marks, respectively for the sign ANIMAL FARM and for the sign 1984, claiming goods and services relating to audio, video, magnetic, and digital media, books and printed matter, games and toys, as well as education and entertainment services.

In June and July 2019, the Office partially refused both applications pursuant to Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, considering the signs descriptive of certain characteristics of the goods and services claimed and, in any event, devoid of distinctive character.

Following the appeal brought by the Estate of the late Sonia Brownell Orwell, the Fifth Board of Appeal referred both cases to the Grand Board of Appeal, noting the existence of divergent case law on the registrability of titles of literary works as trademarks and of the names of well-known characters from artistic works.

The Decision

The Grand Board of Appeal held that, for the goods and services claimed in Classes 9, 16, and 41 (as well as, for the ANIMAL FARM mark alone, Class 28), the signs ANIMAL FARM and 1984 would be perceived by a significant part of the relevant public as the titles of Orwell's novels, and therefore as an indication of the subject matter or content of the goods and services themselves, without any further cognitive step being required.

The Grand Board observed that the relevant public normally relies on the title and the author to identify and select an artistic work, whereas the identification of the commercial origin of the related goods and services takes place through other elements, such as the publisher or other distinctive signs used in the market.

This would reflect an underlying functional difference: a trademark identifies the commercial origin of goods and services, while a title serves primarily to designate and distinguish the work itself. In the absence of an established market practice whereby the title of a single work is used as an indicator of the undertaking responsible for the goods or services, and of evidence demonstrating that the public has been educated in that sense, the public would not be accustomed to perceiving such titles as indicators of origin, nor would such a title be capable of performing the essential function of a trademark.

The Grand Board also addressed the relationship between trademark protection and copyright, clarifying that the signs in question would not indicate that the goods or services originate, as a commercial undertaking, from George Orwell or his foundation, but would rather provide information on the authorship and content of the work embodied in those goods or services: such use would not, therefore, perform the essential function of a trademark, which is to identify the commercial origin of the goods or services and to distinguish them from those of other undertakings.

The Grand Board acknowledged that the existence of a copyright may constitute a relevant factual element for the purposes of assessing the descriptiveness or lack of distinctive character of a sign, since copyright protection may affect the manner in which goods and services with expressive content are created, marketed, and distributed, and thus the public's perception. However, this circumstance would not, in itself, be decisive: the existence of copyright would not alter the fundamental criteria of EU trademark law, which require that a sign be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.

In the case at hand, the Grand Board found that the Estate had not put forward a coherent line of argument supported by adequate evidence to demonstrate that the existence or exercise of copyright had given rise to specific market conditions such as to alter the descriptive or non-distinctive perception of the signs at issue. In particular, there was no evidence on file - such as established commercial practices - capable of demonstrating that the relevant public perceived a connection between the marks applied for and a specific commercial undertaking, nor that the existence of copyright had, in itself, determined or significantly influenced the public's perception of the signs.

On this basis, the Grand Board of Appeal concluded that the signs ANIMAL FARM and 1984 would be perceived by the public as descriptive indications devoid of distinctive character in relation to the content or subject matter of the goods claimed in Classes 9, 16, and 41 (as well as, for the ANIMAL FARM mark alone, Class 28).